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Computerized touchscreen “Direct Recording Electronic” DRE voting systems have been used by 
over 1/3 of American voters in recent elections. In many places, insufficient DRE numbers in 
combination with lengthy ballots and high voter traffic have caused long lines and 
disenfranchised voters who left without voting. We have applied computer queuing simulation to 
the voting process and conclude that far more DREs, at great expense, would be needed to keep 
waiting times low. Alternatively, paper ballot-optical scan systems can be easily and 
economically scaled to prevent long lines and meet unexpected contingencies. 
 
The controversial Presidential election in 2000 
convinced Congress that US voting technology should 
be upgraded, and the result was the Help America 
Vote Act (HAVA) passed in 2002 [1]. This legislation 
established various rules for voting systems, included 
provisions to make voting accessible to people with a 
wide range of disabilities, and funded states to buy 
new voting equipment.12 
Most states and voting precincts now have either 
computer touchscreen “Direct Recording Electronic” 
(DRE) systems (38% of voters in 2006) or paper 
ballot-optical scan (PBOS) equipment (49% of voters) 
[2]. 
DREs generally use a touch-screen on which 
voters enter their choices electronically (e.g. [3]). 
Votes are recorded digitally on a memory card and 
tabulated at the end of the voting day. 
With PBOS systems, voters use a pen or pencil to 
fill in circular or elliptical “bubbles” or complete a 
line on a paper ballot (e.g. [4]). Completed ballots are 
fed through a scanner which tallies the votes. The 
voter-marked ballots are subsequently available for 
manual or machine recounts or audits. 
DREs record votes and keep track of vote totals. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to recount or audit 
paperless DREs and votes have been lost or 
questioned because of DRE malfunctions [5]. As a 
result of DRE breakdown and security concerns, there 
has been a growing demand for “paper trails” for 
DREs to enable recounts and audits [6, 7]. 
Another serious problem associated with DREs is 
the formation of long lines of voters in many venues 
across the United States (California, Florida, 
Maryland, Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Utah and elsewhere [6, 8-14]), sometimes 
requiring several-hour-long waits to vote. Inevitably, 
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some voters caught in such situations—for example, 
the elderly, people with disabilities or illness, people 
needing to get back to work, parents needing to care 
for children—leave without voting and are thereby 
disenfranchised [14]. The simple reason that these 
delays occur is that there are not enough DREs at each 
precinct to allow voting in a timely manner. 
In contrast, PBOS systems can easily be expanded 
to meet an unexpectedly large number of voters or to 
allow extra time to mark a complex or long ballot. For 
a PBOS system, the equivalent traffic choke points to 
DREs are inexpensive marking stations that may be as 
simple as a cardboard screen taped to a table. 
Additional privacy screens can be immediately 
installed if a need for them becomes apparent. In other 
words, PBOS systems allow for “just-in-time” ballot 
stations not possible with DRE systems. 
It is intuitively evident that there must be an ample 
capacity of voting stations in order to cope with 
unexpected fluctuations in voter numbers or voting 
time. Thus it is important to understand the interaction 
between voting systems and voting patterns. 
We have used queuing simulation of elections to 
study voter flow as a function of voter numbers and 
time to vote [15, 16]. We have derived a “Queue-
Stop” rule that that can avoid the formation of 
significant lines. This is easy to accomplish with 
PBOS, but prohibitively expensive for DREs.  
As an example, we apply this approach to 
Maryland, which presently uses Diebold Accuvote OS 
touchscreen DRE voting machines. Maryland has 
nearly 1,800 voting precincts containing from 19 to 
7,000 registered voters each with an average of 1,740 
voters [17]. Maryland state regulations require one 
DRE for each 200 registered voters, plus an additional 
voting unit for every fractional part of that number.” 
[18] The number of DREs per precinct ranges from 2 
to 35 with an average of 9.2 ± 4, and approximately 
16,500 of these DREs are used in every election. [17]. 
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We consider a Maryland election in which 
individual voting takes an average of 5 minutes and 
there is a 75% turnout, i.e. 150 voters per DRE. 
Maryland has a 13-hour Election Day starting at 7 
a.m. and ending at 8 p.m. We assume three heavy 
traffic periods—7-9 am, 12-2 pm, and 5 to 8 pm—and 
suppose that 10% of voters come in each hour during 
these intervals, while 5% per hour arrive during the 
rest of the day. We derive wait time statistics by 
simulating 10,000 elections, assuming a Poisson voter 
arrival process for the average rates described above. 
These voter traffic variations are consistent with 
observations in Columbia County, NY [19, 20]. 
Figure 1 shows queuing simulation results for four 
Election Days with maximum waiting times or late 
closing times over 50 minutes. The long delays occur 
during heavy voter traffic periods: morning, lunch and 
evening.  
One might ask whether the maximum wait times or 
closing delay could be a fluctuation for only a few 
voters, but this is not the case. It is evident that 
buildup and decay of waiting times—the development 
and contraction of extensive lines—is slow, so that a 
high maximum wait implies a drawn-out election 
experience for many voters. For example, the four 
plots in Fig. 1 have 10%-20% (150-300) of all voters 
waiting over 30 minutes. 
Voting congestion is analogous to highway traffic 
jams. When car numbers are low, traffic flows freely. 
As vehicle numbers increase, traffic slows gradually 
until a density is reached at which a few cars become 
stationary, traffic locks up, and long lines form that 
can take hours to clear. 
Figure 2A shows distributions of maximum 
waiting times (the longest time a voter waits in each 
of 10,000 elections) for precincts with different 
numbers of DREs, and Figure 2B shows distributions 
of late closings. The variations are a result of voter 
number fluctuations, and it is apparent that precincts 
with more DREs smooth out the variations. 
We can find the fraction of precincts with specific 
waiting times or late closing delays by determining 
the fractional area under each curve in Fig. 2 starting 
with the time of interest. For example, 82.5% of 
precincts with 2 DREs will have maximum waits of 
more than 45 minutes compared to 59.1% of 10-DRE 
precincts. 63.2% of 2-DRE precincts will have greater 
than 45-minute overtimes compared to 68.6% of 10 
DRE precincts. Tables 1A and 1B show these values 
 
Figure 2. (A) Maximum wait and (B) late closing times for a 
precinct with 150 actual voters per machine in a 13 hour 
Election Day. 10% of the voters arrive each hour between 7-9 
am, 11 am-1 pm, and 5 pm – 8 pm. 5% of the voters arrive 
during each of the other six hours. 10,000 elections were 
simulated and the results normalized so that the maximum 
point has value 1. More machines smooth fluctuations and 
produce narrower distributions, even though there are still 
150 voters per machine. 
Figure 1. Four election sessions with maximum waiting times 
over 50 minutes. These occur during morning, lunch or 
evening heavy voter flow periods. Note that the buildup and 
decay of long waits—in other words, long queues—is slow, so 
a long maximum wait is an indication that many voters will 
have long delays. 
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for a series of maximum waits and closing delays.  
To test the sensitivity of queue formation to 
changing parameters, we carried out 100,000-voter 
election simulations for a 10-DRE precinct varying 
time to vote and number of voters per DRE.  
Fig. 3(A) shows the fraction of precincts with  
various waiting times as a function of the time needed 
to vote assuming (as above) precincts with 150 actual 
voters per DRE. Figure 3(B) displays the same 
fraction vs. number of voters per DRE in precincts 
assuming a voting time of 5 minutes. 
Both these plots illustrate the extreme sensitivity of 
the generation of long lines/waits to polling place 
conditions. From Fig. 3(A), a 4.6 minute voting time 
would result in only 0.1% of precincts with a 
maximum wait of over one hour. But a 5 minute 
voting time would cause 10% of precincts to have 
one-hour waits. 138 voters per DRE in Fig. 3(B) cause 
0.1% of precincts to have greater than one hour 
maximum waits, but 10% of precincts would have 
Table 1A. Fraction of precincts that will have the maximum waiting times specified as a function of the 
number of DREs in the precinct. Statistics were calculated from 10,000 simulated elections assuming 150 voters 
per DRE, each taking an average of 5 minutes to vote, with a 13 hour Election Day.   
 >15 min >30 min > 45 min > 60 min > 75 min > 90 min > 105 min > 120 min 
2 DREs 100.0% 98.6% 82.5% 47.4% 18.3% 5.6% 1.2% 0.3% 
5 DREs 100.0% 98.6% 69.2% 21.3% 2.9% 0.2% 0% 0% 
10 DREs 100.0% 99.0% 59.1% 9.6% 0.3% 0% 0% 0% 
15 DREs 100.0% 99.4% 54.8% 5.1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
20 DREs 100.0% 99.7% 53.6% 2.6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
30 DREs 100.0% 99.9% 51.5% 0.7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Table 1B. Fraction of precincts that will have long closing delays specified as a function of the number of DREs 
in the precinct. Statistics were calculated from 10,000 simulated elections on Election Day.   
 >15 min >30 min > 45 min > 60 min > 75 min > 90 min > 105 min > 120 min 
2 DREs 96.6% 85.8% 63.2% 37.1% 16.7% 5.7% 1.4% 0.40% 
5 DREs 99.6% 92.9% 65.3% 25.7% 4.7% 0.4% 0.02% 0% 
10 DREs 100.0% 97.6% 68.6% 17.6% 0.9% 0.02% 0% 0% 
15 DREs 100.0% 99.2% 71.6% 12.5% 0.3% 0% 0% 0% 
20 DREs 100.0% 99.6% 75.0% 9.0% 0.03% 0% 0% 0% 
30 DREs 100.0% 100.0% 79.1% 4.9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Figure 3. (A) Fraction of polling places with maximum waiting times vs. time to vote, given 150 voters per DRE and (B) 
number of voters per DRE given a 5 minute voting time. 100,000 elections were simulated for each data point. The results show 
that small changes in time to vote (A) or voters per DRE (B) produce big changes in the fraction of polling places with long 
waits. 
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those kinds of waits with 150 voters per DRE. 
So a 9% change of time to vote or number of 
voters per DRE causes a 100X increase in the number 
of precincts with greater than 60 minute maximum 
waits. 
Given the sensitivity of waiting times to small 
changes in voter numbers and voting times, can we 
specify a number of DREs that will prevent queues? 
In general we know that such a rule must provide a 
substantial reserve of DREs in order to cope with 
highly variable election conditions.  
We suggest for this purpose a “Queue Stop” rule 
which is calculated using the formula  
 
2
Day
DRE Vote
T
NV T× ≤  (1) 
where DRENV  is the number of voters per DRE in a 
day, VoteT  is the number of minutes it takes each voter 
to mark a ballot and DayT  is the total minutes in the 
Election Day. 
For example, suppose we have a 13-hour voting 
day (780 minutes) and voting takes on average 
5 minutes. This gives ( )(1/ 2) 780 / 5 78DRENV ≤ × = . 
So there should be at least one DRE for every 78 
actual voters. 
Assuming a potential 75% turnout, the number of 
registered voters per DRE, regNV , is related to the 
number of actual voters per DRE by 
 75%DRE regNV NV= ⋅  (2) 
Continuing our example, we should therefore have 
at least one DRE for 
( )78/ 75% 104regNV = =  registered voters. This is 
nearly twice as many DREs as are prescribed by 
Maryland law, which specifies one DRE per 200 
registered voters [18]. 
We can rearrange Eq. 1 to find a recommended 
average voting time for a given set of election 
parameters. 
 1
2
Day
Vote
DRE
T
T
NV
≤ ×  (3) 
200 registered voters specified by Maryland law 
[18] would give 150DRENV =  voters for a 
75% turnout. Eq. 3 says 
( ) ( )780min/150 1/ 2 2.6min.VoteT ≤ × =    If  VoteT  
exceeds this value, then long lines will likely form 
somewhere. 
Figure 4 is a contour plot of waiting times vs. 
voting time and voter numbers. The closeness of the 
contours again indicates the sensitivity of waiting 
times to voter numbers and average voting times. The 
lowest trace is a “Queue-Stop” contour, following 
Eq. 1 above. 
The Queue-Stop contour lies well below other 
curves and should therefore eliminate the chance of 
long queues if the combination of average voting time 
and number of voters per DRE are on or below that 
line.  
However, an unexpected fluctuation—a long ballot 
or extra voters—can easily push the queuing product 
DRE VoteNV T× higher in the plot where long waits 
become probable. 
The paper ballot marking station in a PBOS system 
represents the same potential choke point for voters as 
does a DRE. The high cost of DREs, however—about 
$3,000 each in MD [21]) —compared to inexpensive 
ballot marking privacy booths ($200 [22]) or 
cardboard screens (a few dollars) means that it is far 
more economical to provide a large reserve capacity 
for ballot marking than to do the same for DREs. 
More crucial is the fact that extra ballot marking 
capacity can be installed essentially instantly with 
 
 
Figure 4. Maximum waits as a 
function of average voting time 
and number of voters per 
machine for a precinct with 10 
DREs. The “Queue Stop” rule 
that would eliminate waits is 
calculated from the formula 
× ≤ 2DRE Vote DayNV T T . Its curve 
lies well below the contours for 
even a 15-minute wait. The 
extreme sensitivity of maximum 
waiting times is again exhibited 
by the closeness of these 
contours. 
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paper ballot voting—for example, by taping extra 
cardboard screens to tables—whereas it is difficult to 
bring in extra DREs, assuming that the local election 
jurisdiction even has any extras. 
Lee, Massachusetts, with 3800 active voters 
changed from eight mechanical lever voting machines 
to PBOS with 35 marking booths and one scanner. In 
the 2004 general election, 3200 people voted in Lee. 
The town clerk Suzanne Scarpa said that the lever 
machines in the past had caused “long, long lines,” but 
that there were no lines for the marking booths or the 
scanner [23]. 
We can also apply queuing simulation to ballot 
scanning. In the voting documentary “Bought and 
Sold,” ballots pass through two different ballot 
scanners in less than 1 s each [23]. The total cycle 
time between corresponding positions for consecutive 
voters must include the time to walk to and leave the 
scanner.  
The cycle time for a very simple scanner that just 
accepts and processes the paper could be 5 s or less. If 
the voter has to look at a scanner display which 
indicates over- or undervotes, the time may increase, 
say to 10 s or more. (An “undervote” means that the 
voter has not made a choice in one of the ballot 
contests; an “overvote” occurs when a voter has 
improperly chosen too many candidates.) Inspecting a 
ballot image could take 30 s to 60 s or longer. 
We have calculated the probability of maximum 
waiting times for various numbers of voters taking 5 s, 
10 s, 30 s or 60 s to scan their ballots. Since these 
processes are relatively stable, we set a threshold as 
the number of voters per scanner that has a probability 
of 0.1% that there will be a maximum wait of more 
than 15 minutes. Results are shown in Table 2. 
A single scanner with a vote cycle time of 5 s 
could support over 7300 voters. If two sheets of paper 
are needed, then the cycle time might move toward 10 
s, in which case a single scanner would support about 
3600 voters. (Voting scanners generally can scan both 
sides of a single sheet simultaneously.) 
In Maryland, the largest single precinct has 6971 
registered voters[17]. A 75% turnout for this precinct 
would be 5228 voters, well within the limits for a 
single, simple scanner taking 5 s per voter. A 75% 
turnout giving 3500 voters (10 s per voter) 
corresponds to 4667 registered voters. In Maryland, 
only 4 out of 1795 polling places have more than 4667 
voters. Thus the overwhelming majority of Maryland 
polling places could function well with a single 
scanner and voter cycle time 5-10 s. 
We can also consider possible queues at the check-
in database terminals known as “E-Pollbooks” in 
Maryland. WAE has served as an election worker in 
Maryland for three elections and measured the 
average check-in time to be approximately 1 minute. 
Applying the last row of Table 2, we conclude that 
there should be at least one check-in terminal for 
every 462 actual voters or 616 registered voters based 
on 75% turnout. 
Maryland has nearly 1800 polling places. If 180 
polling places (10%) or 18 polling places (1%) or 
even 2 (0.1%) were seriously congested with long 
delays for voters, there could be significant effects on 
local, regional or national elections and consequent 
political disputes. As noted by Clive Thompson, 
“voting requires a level of precision we demand from 
virtually no other technology.” [5]   
The 2004 and 2006 Maryland elections had a 
number of voting precincts with very long lines. The 
2006 ballot in Prince George’s County had 37 items 
including election contests and ballot questions (aka 
“propositions” or “referendums”). Ms. Rebecca 
Wilson, a Chief Election Judge there, estimates that 
voting in her precinct took 15-25 minutes on average 
in that election. [24] 
The 2008 Presidential election is hotly contested 
and turnout of over 80% is predicted in Maryland 
[25].  Some ballots will be lengthy. In addition to the 
Presidential, Congressional and other electoral 
contests, there will be two statewide ballot questions 
and many local ballot questions: 7 for Prince George’s 
County, 11 for Baltimore County and 16 for Baltimore 
City. [26] 
In order to avoid long lines it is necessary to have a 
large reserve capacity to deal with election 
fluctuations. The Maryland formula for DRE numbers 
[18] might seem reasonable. However, our 
calculations show that a 75% turnout, and a 5-minute 
or longer voting time average, would require twice as 
many DREs to guarantee a smooth election. 
Thus conditions will be ripe Nov. 4 for long lines 
in Maryland and other places that use DREs, with 
consequent disruption of the voting process. The Ohio 
Secretary of State has expressly directed Ohio election 
workers to use paper ballots to relieve congestion 
caused by DREs [27], and Indiana and California are 
similarly prepared. Unfortunately, Maryland is not, as 
is the case with a number of other states [28].  
Table 2. Process time vs. number of voters per 
voting system (scanner or e-pollbook) that 
would cause 1% of precincts to have maximum 
waits over 30 minutes. 
Voter cycle time 
(seconds) 
Actual voters per 
voting system 
5 8000 
10 3911 
30 1074 
60 462 
 -6- 
References 
1. Federal Election Commision, "Help America Vote Act 
of 2002, Public Law 107-52".  [cited September 28, 
2008]; Available from 
http://www.fec.gov/hava/hava.htm. 
2. K. W. Brace, Election Data Services, "Almost 55 
Million, or One-Third of the Nation's Voters, Will Face 
New Voting Equipment in 2006 Election".  August 2, 
2006. [cited September 28, 2008]; Available from 
http://tinyurl.com/65xebc. 
3. J. Strickland, K. Bonsor, howstuff works, "How E-
voting Works".  [cited September 28, 2008]; Available 
from http://people.howstuffworks.com/e-voting1.htm. 
4. Premier Election Solutions, "Accuvote--OSX".  [cited 
September 28, 2008]; Available from 
http://tinyurl.com/4kep9y. 
5. C. Thompson, “Can You Count on Voting Machines?,” 
New York Times, January 6, 2008, pp. Available from 
http://tinyurl.com/yrxjum. 
6. M. Riess et al., “Voting in 2006: Have We Solved the 
Problems of 2004?”  (The Century Foundation, 
10/2006), Available from http://tinyurl.com/6qxdob. 
7. A. Cohen, “The Good News (Really) About Voting 
Machines,” New York Times, January 10, 2007, pp. 
Available from http://tinyurl.com/62vmz9. 
8. D. Karp, T. Zucco, S. Nohlgren, L. LaPeter, St. 
Petersburg-Tampa Bay Times, "Biggest voting gripe: 
long lines".  November 3, 2004. [cited September 28, 
2008]; Available from http://tinyurl.com/5t5lz2. 
9. VerifiedVoting.org, "Machine Problems Cause Long-
Lines, Voter Dissatisfaction and Ultimately a New 
Election In Hinds County, Mississippi".  January 26, 
2004. [cited September 28, 2008]; Available from 
http://tinyurl.com/6ljhb6. 
10. I. Urbina, New York Times, "Officials Wary of 
Electronic Voting". New York Times  September 24, 
2006. [cited September 28, 2008]; Available from 
http://tinyurl.com/3nja9o. 
11. B. Schrade, A. Paine, R. Loos, L. A. O'Neal, The 
Tennessean, "Metro wants more voting machines".  
November 9, 2006. [cited September 28, 2008]; 
Available from http://tinyurl.com/64ogbr. 
12. G. Kane, Recordnet.com, "Polling woes in S. J. (San 
Joaquin, CA)".  November 9, 2006. [cited September 
28, 2008]; Available from http://tinyurl.com/67pkbb. 
13. The Valley Independent, "Rage against the machines".  
November 9, 2006. [cited September 28, 2008]; 
Available from 
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/valleyindependent/edi
torial/s_479013.html. 
14. “E-Voting Failures in the 2006 Mid-Term Elections”  
(VotersUnite.Org, January 7, 2007), Available from 
http://www.votersunite.org/info/E-VotingIn2006Mid-
Term.pdf. 
15. Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia, "Queueing theory".  
September 29, 2008. [cited September 30, 2008]; 
Available from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Queueing_theory. 
16. T. Allen, M. Bernshteyn, "Mitigating Voter Waiting 
Times," Chance Magazine 19, 25 (2006). 
17. W. A. Edelstein, “Number of Registered Voters in 
Each MD Precinct by Party Affiliation”  
(SaveOurVotes, July 30, 2007), Available from 
http://tinyurl.com/4tlbe9. 
18. State of MD, "COMAR 33.10.02.07. Number of 
Voting Units; Privacy Booths".  October 2, 2007. [cited 
September 28, 2008]; Available from 
http://www.dsd.state.md.us/comar/33/33.10.02.07.htm. 
19. K. Dow, “Study of Voter Flow at the 2006 General 
Election, Columbia County, NY”  (Columbia County 
Board of Elections, April 27, 2007), Available from 
http://www.nyvv.org/newdoc/county/StudyOfVoterFlo
wAtThe2006GeneralElection04-27.pdf. 
20. K. Dow, “Voter Flow During Each 2-Hour Interval 
Throughout Election Day”  (Columbia County Board 
of Elections, November 7, 2006), Available from 
http://www.nyvv.org/newdoc/county/VoterFlowStudy2
006GE-Final.xls. 
21. A. P. Harris et al. "Maryland 2005 SB009 Fiscal and 
Policy Note," Maryland General Assembly, 2005, 
Available from http://tinyurl.com/6kp4gh, 
http://tinyurl.com/6j65c8. 
22. R. Wilson, “Cost Analysis of Maryland’s Electronic 
Voting System”  (SaveOurVotes Maryland, January 
2008), Available from 
http://www.saveourvotes.org/legislation/packet/08-
costs-mdvotingsystem.pdf. 
23. R. Millman, "Bought and Sold," August, 2006, 
Available from 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2sXeCE-mpoE. 
24. R. Wilson, "2004 and 2006 Long Voter Lines in Prince 
George's County".  September 10, 2007. [cited 
September 28, 2007]; Available from 
http://tinyurl.com/46m2ng. 
25. M. Zapotosky, “Electing to prepare for a record,” 
Washington Post, August 7, 2008, pp. G02. Available 
from http://tinyurl.com/5woukn. 
26. Maryland State Board of Elections, "2008 Ballot 
Questions".  [cited September 28, 2008]; Available 
from http://tinyurl.com/3wx98l. 
27. J. Brunner, Ohio Secretary of State, "Optical Scan 
Ballots for Voters in Counties Using DRE Voting 
Machines".  July 25, 2008. [cited September 28, 2008]; 
Available from http://tinyurl.com/4tsaoa. 
28. L. Norden, L. Seago, S. Goodman, S. Flaherty, P. 
Smith, “Is American ready to vote? State preparations 
for voting machine problems in 2008”  (Brennan 
Center for Justice, New York University School of 
Law, October 16, 2008), Available from 
http://tinyurl.com/4grabh. 
 
